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CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Statutes of limitations are a balance between the interests in protecting
valid claims and the interest in prohibiting the prosecution of stale claims.'
Congress, however, has frequently failed to provide a statute of limitations for
federal causes of action. Allowing such actions to be brought after any length
of time was not Congress's intent.2 Therefore, the federal courts must find a
statute of limitations to apply to such actions. Unwilling to fashion a period of
limitations on their own,3 the federal courts have resorted to borrowing one
from a state or federal statute.4 In order to achieve a proper balance for feder-
al causes of action that do not have a statute of limitations, courts borrow a
period of limitations from an analogous state cause of action.' This task often
is very difficult.
From September 1993 through December 1994, the Tenth Circuit con-
fronted the issue of borrowing a statute of limitations for two different federal
civil rights causes of action. In Arnold v. Duchesne County,6 the Tenth Circuit
determined the appropriate statute of limitations to borrow for a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' Although the Utah state legislature had
passed a statute of limitations specifically for § 1983 actions, the court applied
Utah's residual statute of limitations instead.8 In Jones v. Runyon,9 the Tenth
Circuit decided which statute of limitations applied to a civil rights action
1. Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal "Fallback" Statute of Limitations: Limitations by
Default, 72 NEB. L. REv. 454, 462-63 (1993).
2. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336,
342 (1805)).
3. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966) (fashioning a period of lim-
itations would be a "drastic sort of judicial legislation" by federal courts).
4. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987).
5. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271.
6. 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
7. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Three main objectives of § 1983 were: (1) to override certain state legislation infringing
upon the rights or privileges of United States citizens; (2) to provide a remedy where state law
was inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy was theoretically but
not practically available. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961). The primary purpose of §
1983 is to enable an individual whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged by a
person acting under color of law to recover damages or secure injunctive relief. See Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984).
8. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 985-89.
9. 32 F.3d 1454 (10th Cir. 1994).
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brought by a federal employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act after a final administrative decision denied his promotion.'" The court
borrowed the limitations period from a similar action brought by a federal
employee under Title VII."
I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ACrIONS
A. Background
Civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not have express
statutes of limitations. 2 Moreover, Congress has not enacted a general limita-
tions period for all civil rights actions, and until recently, no fallback statute of
limitations existed. 3 Traditionally, federal courts have borrowed a period of
limitations from state law in order to fill the gap left by Congress. 4 The Su-
preme Court, in Burnett v. Grattan,5 interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 198816 to re-
quire the federal courts to apply a three step procedure for selecting a state
limitations period:
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far
as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights
statute] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake
the second step by considering application of state "common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum
State. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest:
courts are to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States."' 7
The Court clarified the second step by reference to its previous decisions
that required the federal courts to apply the "most appropriate" or most "anal-
10. Id. at 1455.
11. Id. at 1458; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(c) (1988) (providing a 30-day limitations peri-
od for a federal employee after receipt of notice of final action taken by the EEOC on a complaint
of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993) (increasing the limitations period to 90 days as required by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991).
12. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 262 (1985).
13. Congress recently passed a residual statute of limitations for federal statutory claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. V 1993). This will not affect the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions,
however, because § 1658 applies only to statutes passed after December 1, 1990. Id.
14. See, e.g., Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67, 267 n.12 (citations omitted).
15. 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
16. Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of [this title] ... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the
laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provi-
sions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the com-
mon law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a
criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48 (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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ogous" state limitations period. 8 This attempted clarification, however, did
not end the confusion because "appropriate" and "analogous" are not synony-
mous, and the terms were supplied without much explanation or elabora-
tion.' The federal courts developed a number of different analytical methods
in trying to choose the most appropriate or analogous statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions. 0
At least seven circuits used a factual analogy,2' in which they would se-
lect a statute of limitations for a state law claim that was factually similar to
the § 1983 claim alleged.22 The factual analogy led to time-consuming litiga-
tion, different limitation periods for allegations within the same § 1983 com-
plaint, and unpredictability.23
Four circuits adopted the statutory liability analogy method.24 Under this
method, the courts applied limitation periods created by the state statute gov-
erning similar actions, on the theory that such statutes were most appropriate
because § 1983 actions stemmed from a federal statute.25 Some courts using
this analogy applied state statutes of limitations the state legislature had made
applicable expressly to § 1983 actions.26 Although the statutory liability anal-
ogy achieved state-wide uniformity, commentators criticized the method for
adopting limitation periods motivated by state interests 27 and for the analyti-
18. Id. at 49.
19. Paul Rathburn, Note, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983: More
Than 'A Half Measure of Uniformity', 73 MINN. L. REv. 85, 91 (1988).
20. Id. at 92; see also Gregory L. Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil Rights Dilem-
ma, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 16-27 (1983-84); Mark D. Jarmie, Selecting an Analogous State Limita-
tions Statute in Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts Claims: The Tenth Circuit's Resolution, 15 N.M.
L. REV. 11, 18-36 (1985); Brian Kibble-Smith, Statutes of Limitation and Section 1983: Implica-
tions for Illinois Civil Rights Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 415, 418-21 (1987); Michael J.
Brophy, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
97, 98-101; Lee L. Cameron, Jr., Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limi-
tations for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 440, 442-43 (1986); Dirk J. Holkeboer,
Note, A Call for Uniformity: Statutes of Limitation in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE L.
REv. 61, 65-67 (1979).
21. See Rathbum, supra note 19, at 92 n.38 (citing various circuits' decisions that utilized a
factual analogy).
22. See, e.g., McClamn v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (applying the one-
year limitations period for an analogous common law assault cause of action to a § 1983 claim
alleging deprivation of constitutional rights after police officer allegedly beat and threatened the
claimant).
23. Rathburn, supra note 19, at 92-93; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)
(stating that the factual analogy approach "inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming liti-
gation that is foreign to the central purposes of § 1983"); Biehler, supra note 20, at 34 (conclud-
ing that confusion and prejudice result from the inconsistent application of factual analogies);
Brophy, supra note 20, at 99 (characterizing factual analogies as mechanical, fragmented, and
producing uncertainty); Cameron, supra note 20, at 443 (criticizing factual analogies for often
forcing courts to rely upon misleading allegations in the pleadings).
24. See Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1981); Pauk v.
Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Cole v.
Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cit. 1980); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
25. Rathbum, supra note 19, at 93.
26. See, e.g., Nored v. Blehm, 743 F.2d 1386, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (apply-
ing OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (1975) which specifically referred to § 1983 actions at that time).
But see Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting VA. CODE ANN. § 8-
24 (Michie 1950) one-year limitation on all § 1983 claims).
27. See Rathbum, supra note 19, at q4 n.51 ("This criticism goes beyond the statutory liabil-
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cal flaws in the analogy.28
At least four other circuits adopted a catch-all analogy and applied the
limitations period for all state actions not otherwise limited.29 This method
was used mainly when courts applying the statutory liability analogy failed to
locate a statutory liability provision. ° Commentators criticized this approach
for being arbitrary3 and adopting limitation periods motivated by state inter-
ests.
32
In 1985, the Supreme Court adopted a general tort analogy approach in
Wilson v. Garcia.33 The Supreme Court held that: (1) federal law governs the
characterization of § 1983 for limitations purposes; 34 (2) a single character-
ization of all § 1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial purposes; 35 (3) the
most appropriate characterization was as a personal injury claim;36 and (4)
the state's personal injury statute of limitations should apply.37 The Court
found that the personal injury tort actions were most analogous because they
were similar to the nature of § 1983 actions.3' Although Wilson clarified
which analogy the federal courts should use, practical problems remained.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, claimed that the majority's rule provided
no guidance for courts using state law that "defie[s] the newly minted rule by
supplying not one but two periods that govern various injuries to personal
rights.139 Because state law possibly will not "obligingly supply a limitations
period to match an abstract analogy that may have little relevance to the forum
State's limitations scheme,"'  Justice O'Connor advocated the continued use
of the factual analogy method.4 Thus, even after Wilson, federal courts re-
mained confused about which personal injury statute of limitations should be
applied when the state had more than one.42 When faced with this problem,
several federal courts applied the intentional personal injury statute of limita-
ity analogy to the heart of the 'borrowing' process. Some critics contend that only a federal limita-
tions period should govern § 1983 actions. They argue that state limitations periods, although
sufficient for state actions, cannot properly govern federal constitutional claims.").
28. See id. at 94 n.52 ("The gist of this 'analytical' criticism rests with the nature of § 1983.
Because § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather enforces other rights existing in the
Constitution and federal law, it makes little sense to analogize § 1983 to a statute that creates both
a substantive right and remedy.") (emphasis added).
29. See McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Colorado's
"residuary" statute of limitations); Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 & n.11 (8th Cir.) (apply-
ing Iowa's general catch-all statute of limitations), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Baker v. F
& F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191, 1198 (7th Cir.) (applying Illinois catch-all statute), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 821 (1970); Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.C. 1985) (applying
District of Columbia's catch-all statute).
30. Rathburn, supra note 19, at 95.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 96.
33. 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
34. Id. at 270.
35. Id. at 271-75.
36. Id. at 276.
37. Id. at 275.
38. Id. at 276.
39. Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 287.
41. Id.
42. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
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tions, theorizing that intentional torts are most closely analogous to the claims
Congress envisioned being brought under § 1983. 41 Other federal courts con-
sidered the analogy to the intentional tort action too narrow because § 1983
embraces a broad array of actions for personal injuries, and thus applied the
residuary personal injury statute of limitations.4
In 1989, the Supreme Court again considered which statute of limitations
should apply to § 1983 claims in order to settle the disagreement between the
federal courts.45 In Owens v. Okure, the Supreme Court held that when a
state had multiple limitation periods for personal injury actions, the state's
general or residual personal injury statute of limitations should be applied for
§ 1983 actions.' Finally, the issue appeared settled.
In 1987, however, the Utah state legislature muddied the waters again by
enacting section 78-12-28(3) of the Utah Code, which provided for a two-year
statute of limitations in actions "for injury to the personal rights of another as
a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983."' This is the only effective statute
in the country that provides an explicit limitations period for § 1983 ac-
tions.' Thus, in Utah, the federal courts were forced to decide whether to
apply Utah's four-year residual statute of limitations'9 or to apply the two-
43. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985) (selecting Ohio statute
of limitations for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and
malpractice, and rejecting statute of limitations for bodily injury or for injury to the rights of the
plaintiff not enumerated elsewhere), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d
916, 920 (5th Cir. 1985) (selecting Mississippi statute of limitations for most intentional torts, and
rejecting statute for causes of action not otherwise provided for), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065
(1986); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1254-56 (11 th Cir. 1985) (selecting Alabama
statute of limitations governing actions for "any trespass to person or liberty, such as false impris-
onment or assault and battery" and rejecting statute for "any injury to the person or rights of an-
other not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section") (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1523-24 & n. 11 (1Oth Cir. 1988) (selecting
Oklahoma statute of limitations for "injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not
hereinafter enumerated", and rejecting statute for assault or battery) (citations omitted); Banks v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that it
"might well" apply District of Columbia statue of limitations for claims not otherwise provided for
and rejecting statute for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution,
false arrest, or false imprisonment); Small v. Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 546-49 (1st Cir. 1986) (select-
ing Maine's statute of limitations governing all tort actions except as otherwise provided and
rejecting statute for assault and battery, false imprisonment, slander, libel, and medical malprac-
tice); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (selecting Colorado statute of
limitations for "all other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided
by law," and rejecting statutes for trespass and trespass on the case) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-80-108(1)(b) (1973)).
45. Owens, 488 U.S. at 243-48.
46. Id. at 249-50.
47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3) (1992).
48. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 982, 985 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 721 (1995). Virginia had a statute that specifically provided a one-year limitation for § 1983
actions, but it was held inapplicable in Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316, 1317 (4th Cir. 1978),
and repealed after four years. Id. Oregon also had such a statute which the Ninth Circuit applied
to § 1983 actions, but the specific reference to § 1983 has since been removed from the statute.
Id. (citing Nored v. Blehm, 743 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).
49. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) (1992). Section 78-12-25(3) provides a four-year
statute of limitations for "an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law." Id.
1995]
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year statute of limitations applicable specifically to § 1983 actions." The fed-
eral district court judges in Utah were divided on the question.' The Tenth
Circuit addressed this issue in Arnold v. Duchesne County.2
B. Arnold v. Duchesne County
3 3
1. Facts
On April 21, 1988, officers of the Duchesne County Sheriff's Department
arrested Louis F. Arnold and charged him with selling a stolen firearm.54 The
Duchesne County Attomey dismissed the charges against Mr. Arnold on June
27, 1988."5 Mr. Arnold brought an action on April 17, 1992, against
Duchesne County, Sheriff Clair Poulson, and officers Merv Taylor and Jerry
Foote, asserting claims under state law and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986
and 1988.56 Mr. Arnold alleged that his arrest had been politically motivated
and "the police had actual knowledge at the time of his arrest that the firearm
in question was not stolen."57
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that section 78-12-28(3) of
the Utah Code, which imposed a two-year statute of limitations on § 1983
actions, barred Mr. Arnold's § 1983 claim." The district court held that sec-
tion 78-12-28(3) was the most appropriate and analogous statute of limitations
for § 1983 actions and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.59 In so
holding, the court noted that the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Garcia,' had
directed the federal courts to use the most appropriate or analogous state stat-
ute of limitations.6' The district court dismissed the Supreme Court's decision
in Owens v. Okure 2 to apply the residual personal injury statute of limita-
tions because Utah had provided an express statute of limitations for § 1983
actions. The court instead concluded that the Supreme Court's directive was to
follow the Wilson mandate of choosing the most analogous or appropriate
50. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 983.
51. Compare Adamson v. City of Provo, 819 F. Supp. 934, 948 (D. Utah 1993) (applying
Utah's residual four-year statute of limitations rather than § 78-12-28(3) to § 1983 actions) and
Sheets v. Lindsey, 783 F. Supp. 577, 581 (D. Utah 1991), affd sub nom. Sheets v. Salt Lake
County, Nos. 93-4128, 93-4134, 1995 WL 8224 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995) (same) with Arnold v.
Duchesne County, 810 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (D. Utah 1993) (applying § 78-12-28(3) to bar § 1983
action), rev'd, 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995) and Tarlip v. Van
Austin, No. 92-C-621-W, 1993 WL 723501, at *4-5 (D. Utah May 18, 1993) (adopting report and
recommendation following Arnold and applying § 78-12-28(3)), aff d sub nom. Tarlip v. Buckner,
17 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1994) and Thompson v. Rasmussen, No. 91-C-1039-S, 1993 WL 723845,
at *2 (D. Utah May 5, 1993) (same).
52. 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 983.
55. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 810 F. Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 26 F.3d
982 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
56. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 983.
57. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1240.
58. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 983.
59. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1247.
60. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
61. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1242.
62. 488 U.S. 235, 247-48 (1989).
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statute of limitations.63 Because section 78-12-28(3) was the most analogous
and appropriate, the district court concluded it should be applied unless it was
"inconsistent with federal laws and policy." In order to determine that sec-
tion 78-12-28(3) passed this test, the court examined both procedural due pro-
cess and equal protection attacks.
The district court found that the statute of limitations was procedural in
nature, because the limitations period was not part of the same act as the
cause of action.' Under procedural due process, a statute passes constitution-
al muster if it provides a reasonable time to bring suit.' The district court
held that two years was a reasonable time in light of a number of federal
circuit court decisions applying as little as one year to § 1983 actions.67
In holding that section 78-12-28(3) did not violate equal protection, the
district court found no evidence to support the contention that the Utah state
legislature improperly discriminated against a federal cause of action.' First,
the district court noted that section 78-12-28(3) could be interpreted as apply-
ing to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims in addition to § 1983 claims. 9 Second, even
if the limitations period did not apply to § 1985 claims, §§ 1983 and 1985 are
distinguishable and any difference in limitations periods would be rationally
based.7" Third, the court noted that the two-year period of limitations was the
same as that applied to state actions against state officers, which indicated that
the "legislature reasonably assessed the length of time required to bring a
cause of action against any individual acting under color of state law."'"
Fourth, the court dismissed the claim that the Utah state legislature acted with
improper motives. The court felt the legislature was only trying to set up a
limitations period within the parameters set by the Tenth Circuit in Mismash v.
Murray City72 because of the similarity in the language between Mismash and
the statute.73 Fifth, the court found that Utah had a legitimate interest in set-
ting the statute of limitations, because Utah courts had concurrent jurisdiction
over § 1983 actions.74 Sixth, the court refused to assume that the state
63. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1242 ("[It is logical to assume that the Supreme Court used the
terminology of most appropriate or analogous because there was no express statute of limitations
at issue in either Wilson or Owens.") (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1243.
65. Id. at 1244 ("If not part of the same act, however, the 'limitations period is said to be
only a procedural limit on the remedy, and not a substantive limit on the right'.") (quoting Sarfati
v. Wood Holly Assocs., 874 F.2d 1523, 1526 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
66. Id. (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 n.13 (1989)).
67. Id. at 1244-45.
68. Id. at 1245.
69. Id. at 1245 n.7 (stating that the language "for injury to the personal rights of another as a
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983" does not rule out application of the limitations period to §
1985) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3) (1992)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1245.
72. 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
73. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1246. The Tenth Circuit, in Mismash, applied the four-year
residual statute in Utah, because Utah had no statute of limitations "expressly applicable to actions
for injury to the rights of another." Mismash, 730 F.2d at 1367.
74. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1246-47 (stating that Utah's interests are legitimate and do not
amount to an invasion of the federal domain, because "as long as Congress chooses to defer to the
states in questions of time limitations, the court cannot see that a state is violating the principles
1995]
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legislature's motive in shortening the limitations period was to truncate the
cause of action, because attempting to guess the motives of the legislature was
too imprecise and difficult to be of value." Because the district court found
section 78-12-28(3) was the most analogous and appropriate statute of limita-
tions and both the due process and equal protection standards were met, it ap-
plied the two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. 76
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the four-year
residual statute of limitations under section 78-12-25(3) should apply instead
of the two-year statute of limitations under section 78-12-28(3). 7' The court
initially went through the analyses set forth in Burnett v. Grattan," Wilson v.
Garcia,79 and Owens v. Okure ° and found that, prior to the enactment of
section 78-12-28(3), § 1983 actions were governed by the four-year residual
statute of limitations set forth in section 78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code."' The
court then discussed whether to apply the new statute of limitations enacted
specifically for § 1983 actions.
The Tenth Circuit went through the three step procedure, as mandated by
§ 1988,2 for determining which state statute of limitations to apply to decide
if section 78-12-28(3) should apply to § 1983 actions. First, the court noted
that § 1983 did not have a statute of limitations and therefore, no suitable
federal rule existed. 3 In the absence of a federal rule, the court moved to the
second step, which required the selection of the most analogous or appropriate
statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit assumed that section 78-12-28(3) was
the most analogous statute because the Utah state legislature enacted the stat-
ute specifically to provide a limitations period for § 1983 actions. 4 The court
combined the remainder of the second step with the third step of the § 1988
analysis, and discussed whether section 78-12-28(3) was the most appropriate
limitations period and consistent with federal law and policy.85 The Tenth
Circuit court held that section 78-12-28(3) was not consistent with the purpose
and nature of § 1983.86 First, the court stressed that the characterization of
the essential nature of a § 1983 action was a question of federal law. Even
of federalism by setting an express statute of limitations for civil rights actions, particularly when
the state has concurrent jurisdiction.").
75. Id. at 1247.
76. Id. at 1243, 1247.
77. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 982, 983 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
721 (1995).
78. 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
79. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
80. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
81. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 984-85.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 984.
84. Id. at 985 n.6.
85. Id. at 985-86.
86. Id. at 986 (stating that the primary objectives of the Civil Rights Acts are to ensure that
individuals may recover damages or secure injunctive relief when their federal constitutional or




though federal courts borrow the statute of limitations from state law, the
federal court decides how to characterize the 1983 action in order to borrow
the appropriate limitations period applicable to an analogous state cause of
action."8 This determination is crucial because it allows the federal court to
ensure an acceptable fit between the borrowed limitations period and the poli-
cies behind § 1983.9 The court held that section 78-12-28(3) merely reflects
the Utah legislature's judgment as to the appropriate statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions and usurps the role of the federal courts in characterizing the
essence of those actions." Therefore, section 78-12-28(3) was inconsistent
with federal law and should not be applied to § 1983 actions. 9'
Second, the court found section 78-12-28(3) eliminated the assurances that
neutral rules of decision will apply to § 1983 actions. 92 Section 78-12-28(3)
applies exclusively to § 1983 actions.9 3 Its legislative history revealed that
while the initial proposal applied to the broader category of "personal injury,
or injury to the personal rights of another," it was changed before enactment
to apply specifically and exclusively to § 1983 actions and thus, was no longer
a neutral rule of decision applicable to all personal injury cases.94 The court
concluded that this change was intended to reduce the number of § 1983 ac-
tions and was therefore inconsistent with the broad remedial objectives of such
actions.9 Thus, the court held that the two-year statute of limitations was not
the appropriate period of limitations. 96 Instead, the four-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury actions should be applied to § 1983 actions.97
C. Analysis
With one exception, Congress failed to establish express statutes of limita-
tions for civil rights actions.9" Obviously, Congress did not intend for civil
rights actions to have no statute of limitations.' Therefore, either the federal
courts have to fashion a statute of limitations themselves or they have to bor-
row one from the forum state. The federal courts could not fashion a period of
limitations because it would be a "drastic sort of judicial legislation.'"'" This




92. Id. at 987-88.
93. Id. at 986 (rejecting any arguments that § 78-12-28(3) was intended to apply to any
action other than § 1983 actions).
94. Id. at 988 (stating that had the original proposal been enacted, it would have supplied a
neutral rule of decision).
95. Id. at 988-89, 988 n.9 (noting that the Burnett court made it clear that such a purpose
was impermissible).
96. Id. at 989.
97. See id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988) (providing a one-year-within-accrual limitation period for
claims against persons who negligently refuse to prevent the commission of wrongs conspired to
be done by others as prohibited in 42 U.S.C. § 1985).
99. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) ("A federal cause of action 'brought at any
distance of time' would be 'utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws'.") (quoting Adams v.
Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 342 (1805)).
100. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966).
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left the option of borrowing a state statute of limitations, which is what Con-
gress mandated federal courts to do under § 1988.0' The question then aris-
es: which state statute of limitations should the federal court borrow for each
federal cause of action?
Statutes of limitations are a balance between the interest of having claims
prosecuted and the interest of not wasting time and resources litigating old
claims.'0° When a state legislature enacts a statute of limitations, it strikes
that balance for a particular type of state claim, not federal. The federal courts
try to find a statute of limitations for a state action that is analogous to the
federal action so the federal law will incorporate the state's judgment on the
proper balance for the statute of limitations. 3 When the federal claim differs
from the state cause of action, however, "the State's choice of a specific peri-
od of limitation is, at best, only a rough approximation of 'the point at which
the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests
in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones'."' °
In passing section 78-12-28(3), the Utah state legislature directly balanced
the interests of the federal cause of action under § 1983.1o5 However, in en-
acting the four-year residual statute of limitations the Utah state legislature
balanced the interests, if any balancing occurred at all, for all state actions
without a statute of limitations."° Thus, in Arnold, the court could pick ei-
ther (1) a statute of limitations where the state legislature had directly bal-
anced the interests in the federal cause of action or (2) a statute of limitations
where the state legislature may have balanced the interests inherent in all state
causes of action that did not have a statute of limitations. The purposes of
borrowing a state statute of limitations would have been better served had the
court chosen the former statute of limitations. The major purpose of choosing
an analogous state cause of action from which to borrow a statute of limitation
is to make sure that the interests of the federal cause of action are appropriate-
ly balanced."° Having the state legislature directly balance the interests of
the federal cause of action serves this purpose better than having the federal
court balance the interests and then choose an approximate state cause of
action in which the state may or may not have made the appropriate balancing
considerations.
Allowing the state to balance directly the interests in a federal cause of
action would also aid predictability and reduce litigation. First, borrowing state
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. Nelson, supra note 1, at 462-63.
103. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271 ("By adopting the statute governing an analogous cause of ac-
tion under state law, federal law incorporates the State's judgment on the proper balance between
the policies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of
action.").
104. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)).
105. See Arnold v. Duchesne County, 810 F. Supp. 1239, 1245-46 (1993), rev'd, 26 F.3d 982
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995).
106. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) (1992).
107. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271; Arnold, 26 F.3d at 987 (picking the appropriate limitations
period applicable to an analogous state cause of action is crucial because it better ensures an ac-
ceptable fit between the borrowed limitations period and the policies behind § 1983).
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statutes of limitations leads to uncertainty because litigants do not know which
statute the federal court will borrow. Although the Supreme Court's decision
in Owens v. Okure'" greatly reduced this problem, greater certainty would
result if the state statute expressed both the federal cause of action it applied
to and the statute of limitations for that action. A state statute expressly direct-
ed to § 1983 actions would best accomplish the goal set forth by the Supreme
Court, in Wilson v. Garcia,"° of eliminating uncertainty by providing one
simple broad characterization of all § 1983 actions.
Second, allowing the state legislature to enact specific statutes of limita-
tions for federal causes of action would reduce the amount of litigation on the
subject of borrowing the state statute of limitations. Instead of going through
the three step procedure mandated by § 1988, the federal court would only
need to look at the state statute that applied specifically to the federal cause of
action.
In Arnold v. Duchesne County, the court noted two arguments against
allowing the state legislature to enact a statute of limitations aimed directly at
a federal cause of action." ° The first is that a state legislature which enacts
such a limitations period usurps the role of federal law in characterizing the
essence of such actions."' "'Congress surely did not intend to assign to state
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining
and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.""'
' 2
Although Congress may not have intended to assign the state legislatures such
a role, it has allowed it by not passing a federal statute of limitations and
thereby endorsing the borrowing of state limitation periods. If a state legisla-
ture enacts a statute of limitations for general personal injury actions, the
federal courts are directed by Owens to apply it to § 1983 actions. Thus, a
state legislature is allowed to set a specific statute of limitations for § 1983 ac-
tions so long as it disguises it under a general personal injury limitations peri-
od and does not mention § 1983 in the statute.
The Wilson Court directed federal courts to apply the personal injury
statute of limitations partly to ensure the borrowed period of limitations would
108. 488 U.S. 235, 248 (1989) (holding that a state's general or residual statute of limitations
should be applied to § 1983 actions).
109. 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
110. See Arnold, 26 F.3d at 986-88.
111. Id. at 987; see also Sheets v. Lindsey, 783 F. Supp. 577, 581 (D. Utah 1991):
A state is within its sphere of power in our federal system of government, as a matter of
state policy, when it limits the time within which a state cause of action may be vindi-
cated in state court. In contrast, a federally recognized or federally created cause of
action cannot be foreshortened by specific state legislation.
The concept is simple. The issue before the court concerns the fundamental prin-
ciple of federalism; namely the geographic division of power. A state lacks the power to
truncate federally created or federally recognized rights. The principles of federalism is
[sic] the perennial message of both the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act. Whether
to diminish a federally created right is simply not a choice for a state to make .... De-
termining the statute of limitations for a federally created cause of action, the court
emphasizes, is exclusively a federal choice.
Id.
112. Arnold, 26 F.3d at 986 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269).
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not discriminate against federal civil rights remedies." 3
General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a major
part of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts today,
and probably did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It is most
unlikely that the period of limitations applicable to such claims ever
was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate against
federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in any respect."4
Although this would be true if the state legislature did not know which person-
al injury statute of limitations would apply, it is not true when the state legis-
lature knows that the residual personal injury statute of limitations will apply.
A state legislature could provide a statute of limitations for every state person-
al injury cause of action and then the residual statute of limitations would only
apply to § 1983 actions. This seems to be what the Utah state legislature was
trying to do. Unfortunately, it made the mistake of mentioning that the statute
of limitations should apply to § 1983 actions."5
The federal courts are not willing to give state legislatures such power
explicitly because they are worried that the state legislature would provide a
period of limitations that was too short."6 This protection, however, could be
accomplished by making sure that the statute of limitations did not violate
procedural due process and equal protection."7 Under procedural due process
the statute of limitations must provide the claimant a reasonable time within
which to bring a claim."8 A number of cases have found that limitation peri-
ods as short as one year should be applied to § 1983 actions."9 Thus, Utah's
two-year statute of limitations is hardly unreasonable. 20
Under an equal protection claim, the federal court would not use the limi-
tation period if it was shown that the state legislature improperly discriminated
against the federal cause of action.'' Thus, the state legislature must have a
rational reason for choosing the limitations period.'22 Arguably, the Utah
state legislature's rational reason was to make the § 1983 period of limitations
consistent with the period of limitations for state actions against state officers
acting in their official capacity.'23 Thus, the Utah two-year statute of limita-
tions passed constitutional muster, 24 but was rejected because it expressly
applied to § 1983 actions.'25
The second argument against allowing a state legislature to enact a statute
of limitations aimed directly at a federal cause of action is that it would elimi-
113. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276.
114. Id. at 279.
115. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3) (1992).
116. See Sheets v. Lindsey, 783 F. Supp. 577, 581 & n.9 (D. Utah 1991).
117. See Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1247.
118. Id. at 1244 (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 n.13 (1989)).
119. See id. at 1245 (listing citations).
120. Id. at 1244-45.
121. Id. at 1245.
122. See id. at 1245 n.7.
123. Id. at 1245-46.
124. Id. at 1247.
125. See Arnold, 26 F.3d at 986.
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nate the assurance that neutral rules of decision would apply to § 1983 actions
in Utah.'26 This would only be the case, however, if the state passed a differ-
ent statute of limitations for each federal civil rights cause of action. In Ar-
nold, the court interpreted section 78-12-28(3) to apply exclusively to § 1983
actions; therefore, civil rights actions brought under other sections of the Civil
Rights Acts had a different limitations period.'27 Section 78-12-28(3), how-
ever, could have been interpreted just as easily to apply to other sections of
the Civil Rights Acts, because the statute of limitations was for any action "for
injury to the personal rights of another as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983."2' In addition, an equal protection analysis could ensure that the state
legislature did not discriminate against a particular federal cause of action.
Allowing the state legislature to enact a statute of limitations that express-
ly applied to federal civil rights actions, instead of choosing the residual per-
sonal injury statute of limitations, would better serve the main purpose of
statutes of limitations. The state legislatures could directly balance the interests
of having claims prosecuted and the interest of not wasting time and resources
litigating old claims. This also would provide more certainty and reduce litiga-
tion. Furthermore, the federal courts could use the doctrines of due process
and equal protection to make sure that the limitations period was reasonable
and that neutral rules of decision would apply within the state.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS FOR 29 U.S.C. § 633A ACTIONS
A. Background
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), enacted in 1967,
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees over the age of 40
on the basis of their age." Section 633a of Title 29, which was added to the
ADEA in 1974, prohibits age discrimination by federal government agen-
cies. 3° A federal employee has two alternative routes for pursuing a claim of
age discrimination.' 3' A federal employee may invoke the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) administrative process and then file
a civil action in federal court if not satisfied with the administrative reme-
dies.' In the alternative, the federal employee may choose to bring suit in
federal court in the first instance. 3 Although the ADEA provides time peri-
ods for notification of the EEOC for the latter route,'3 4 it does not set forth
126. Id. at 987.
127. Id. at 987-88 (stating it is arguable that other sections of the Civil Rights Acts would
still be covered by the residual four-year statute of limitations).
128. Arnold, 810 F. Supp. at 1245 n.7 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(3)) (emphasis
added).
129. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 633a provides in pertinent part: "All
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of
age ... in executive agencies as defined in [5 U.S.C. § 105] ... shall be made free from any dis-
crimination based on age." 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).
131. Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 5 (1991).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b), (c).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d).
134. Id. (providing that a claimant must give notice of intent to sue to the EEOC within 180
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limitation periods for either route to federal court."'
When Congress amended the ADEA in 1974 to make it applicable to the
federal government, it did not merely add the government to the definition of
employers subject to the Act. Instead, it added § 633a, which applied to the
federal government and expressly forbade incorporation of any other ADEA
provision into § 633a.'36 The original proposal of § 633a contained a thirty-
day statute of limitations for federal employees after a final administrative
decision. 37 This provision was virtually identical to the thirty-day statute of
limitations for federal employees under Title VI. 3 When the proposed bill
emerged from committee, however, it appeared without a limitations period
and with no explanation for its removal.' Because the ADEA is silent as to
how long after a final administrative decision an action may be filed in district
court, the Supreme Court has indicated that the proper analysis is to assume
"Congress intended to impose an appropriate period borrowed either from a
state statute or from an analogous federal one."'"
There are four possible sources of a statute of limitations for § 633a.
First, a court could adopt a state statute of limitations that covers an analogous
state action. 4' Second, a court could adopt the two-year (three years if will-
ful violation) statute of limitations applicable to private ADEA actions.'42
One district court so held, despite the command in § 633a(f) that the private
sector provisions of the statute do not apply to federal employees.'43 Third, a
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred and then wait 30 days before filing the action,
but not providing a limitations period for filing a claim in the federal court).
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Because the Tenth Circuit, in Jones v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 1454
(10th Cir. 1994), determined only the appropriate statute of limitations for federal employees filing
a claim in federal court after an administrative decision, this survey will not address the statute of
limitations issue arising from claims filed first in federal court. See Stevens v. Department of
Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991) and Edwards v. Shalala, 846 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ga. 1994) for deci-
sions on the statute of limitations for filing a claim in federal court in the first instance.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f) provides: "Any personnel action of any department, agency, or other
entity referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provi-
sion of this chapter, other than the provisions of section 631 (b) of this title and the provisions of
this section."
137. See S. 1861, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 15895 (1972).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993)
(codifying the increased limitations period from 30 to 90 days mandated by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991).
139. Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 1989).
140. Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1991) (citing Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987)). The Supreme Court did not decide
which limitations period to apply because the defendants acknowledged that filing one year and
six days after the allegedly discriminatory event took place was well within whatever statute of
limitations that might apply. Id. at 8. The Court also noted that the plaintiff had received a no-
tification from the EEOC that indicated that he may have up to six years to file the action. Id. at 8
n.2.
141. Jones v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 1454, 1455-56 (10th Cir. 1994) (ruling out the applicability of
state statutes).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1988). The statute of limitations for private ADEA actions was
reduced to 90 days after the date of notice of termination or dismissal from the EEOC by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
143. Wiersema v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 648 F. Supp. 66, 68 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see also
Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F. Supp. 1544, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (limitations period is either two
years under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or two years (three if willful violation) under 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)).
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court could follow the Ninth Circuit'" and apply the general six-year statute
of limitations that applies to all actions against the United States where no
statute of limitations is otherwise provided. 4 Fourth, a court could follow
the First and Second Circuits and apply the thirty-day limitations period for
federal employees filing suit under Title VII.'
B. Jones v. Runyon" 7
1. Facts
Julius J. Jones, an Afican-American male over the age of 40, alleged
that the United States Postal Service denied him the position of ad hoc EEO
counselor on November 7, 1986, due to his race, age, and past protests against
alleged unlawful employment practices at the postal service." Mr. Jones
filed an administrative complaint on December 8, 1986, and the EEOC issued
a final administrative decision on August 28, 1990, finding no discrimina-
tion.'49 Mr. Jones filed a pro se complaint in the District Court of Colorado
on September 28, 1990, but the complaint was dismissed for failure to proper-
ly serve the Postmaster General and the United States.'50 On September 16,
1991, Mr. Jones refiled his discrimination claims in federal district court. The
district court granted the Postmaster General's motion to dismiss on the
ground the action was time barred, holding that the thirty-day limitation period
then applicable to federal employees filing suit under Title VII applied to bar
all of Mr. Jones's claims. 5 ' Mr. Jones appealed the district court's ruling
only with respect to his age discrimination claims.'52
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Mr. Jones's age
discrimination claim was time barred because the statute of limitations for
federal employees alleging age discrimination after a final administrative deci-
sion was thirty days.'53 In so holding, the court noted that because Congress
had not supplied a limitations period, the federal courts were to borrow an
appropriate statute of limitations from a state or federal statute. 54 After set-
144. Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1989). But see Miller v. Department
of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 827 F. Supp. 636, 638 (D. Nev. 1993) (applying the 90-day
statute of limitations according to 1992 EEOC regulations).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988).
146. Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995);
Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1024-27 (1st Cir. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)
(Supp. V 1993) (the Title VII statute of limitations was increased from 30 days to 90 days by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991).
147. 32 F.3d 1454 (10th Cir. 1994).
148. Jones v. Frank, 819 F. Supp. 923, 924 (D. Colo. 1993), aff d sub nom., Jones v. Runyon,
32 F.3d 1454 (10th Cir. 1994).
149. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1454-55.
150. Id. at 1455.
151. Id. The refiling was "almost five years after the alleged discriminatory act and over one
year after the final decision of the EEOC." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1458.
154. Id. at 1455-56 (quoting Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7 (1991) (citing
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ting forth the split of authority among the courts of appeals, the Tenth Circuit
discussed which statute would be appropriate.'
The court ruled out using a state statute, because "[t]o adopt varying state
rules would burden administrative efforts of the EEOC and prove an 'unsatis-
factory vehicle[ ] for the enforcement of federal law'.' 56 Instead, the court
chose to borrow a federal statute. In determining that the statute of limitations
under Title VII should apply, the court first noted that a reasonable source for
borrowing a statute of limitations is an analogous statute where the balancing
of interests Congress intended to protect was very similar.'57 The court found
that the statute of limitations under Title VII was the most analogous statute to
ADEA for three reasons.'58 First, the ADEA and Title VII share the common
purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.'59 Second, the lan-
guage of § 633a(a) and (b) is "almost in haec verba" with § 2000e-16(a) and
(b) of Title VII. r° Third, the legislative history of § 633a indicates that Title
VII was its source.1
6
1
The court then addressed whether the legislative history of § 633a indicat-
ed Congress did not intend for the statute of limitations under Title VII to
apply because it left out the statute of limitations included in the proposal for
§ 633a that was almost identical to the one in Title VII. 62 Because Congress
omitted the limitation without explanation or evidence of debate, the court
determined it could not say Congress's purpose was to preclude the use of the
Title VII statute of limitations.6 3 Thus, the court did not believe the omis-
sion proved Congress intended to make the most appropriate statute of limita-
tions inapplicable to § 633a."6
Lastly, the court found that the change in EEOC regulations, adopting the
Title VII statute of limitations, was persuasive. 65 Prior to 1992, the EEOC
took no position as to the statute of limitations for filing a suit after a final ad-
ministrative decision."6 The notice the EEOC sent out to Mr. Jones, howev-
er, was misleading because it stated that he "MAY have up to six years after
the right of action first accrued."' 167 In 1992, the EEOC changed its position
to that of applying the Title VII limitations period to ADEA claims.' Al-
though the Tenth Circuit noted that there should be less judicial deference to
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987))).
155. Id. at 1456-58.
156. Id. at 1456 (quoting DelCostello %'. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161
(1983)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1456-57.
159. Id. at 1456 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) and Smith v.
Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 731 F.2d 684, 688 (10th Cir. 1984)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1457.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1457-58.
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.514 (1991) (excluding age discrimination complaints expressly from a
limitations period for filing civil actions after a final agency decision).
167. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457 n.7 (emphasis in original).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(c) (1994).
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an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a statute inconsistent
with a previously held position, the court still found the EEOC's position per-
suasive." For these reasons the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that the statute of limitations found in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c),
applied to bar Mr. Jones's ADEA claim under 29 U.S.C. § 633a.1
70
C. Analysis
The issue the Tenth Circuit faced in Jones is directly attributable to
Congress's failure to explain why it omitted a statute of limitations when it
enacted § 633a. That Congress chose to excise from § 633a a statute of limita-
tions identical to the Title VII statute of limitations for federal employees
creates a strong inference that Congress did not want that statute of limitations
to apply.' The Tenth Circuit followed the First and Second Circuits in de-
ciding the omission by Congress should not be determinative of legislative
intent.' The Tenth Circuit, however, did find that the legislative history in-
dicating the ADEA was patterned after, derived from, and similar to Title VII
strongly suggested that the Title VII statute of limitations was an analogous
statute of limitations. 7 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress's omis-
sion of a statute of limitations identical to the one in Title VII was a mistake
and should be ignored.'74
A few courts have refused to ignore the strong inference created by
Congress's omission and have instead ignored the literal reading of §
633a(f) 75 It has been argued that Congress intended broader protection of
federal employees against discriminatory employment practices than private
sector employees.'76 Thus, § 626(e)'s longer statute of limitations would be
more appropriate to achieve the broad remedial purposes of § 633a ac-
169. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1458.
170. Id.
171. Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 220 (9th Cir. 1989); Bomholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d
57, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1989).
172. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457 (following Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1994) and
Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir. 1990)).
173. Id. at 1456-57. One court has argued that there are some differences between the struc-
tures of Title VU and the ADEA:
Unlike Title VII, which requires an aggrieved federal employee to initiate admin-
istrative remedies, the ADEA allows a federal employee either to initiate administrative
remedies or to file suit in federal court after filing a notice of intent to sue. Moreover,
unlike [Title VII], which specifically provides that a plaintiff must exhaust administra-
tive remedies unless certain exceptions are applicable, [the ADEA] does not require a
plaintiff who initiates administrative remedies to exhaust those remedies before bringing
suit in federal court.
Coleman v. Nolan, 693 F. Supp. 1544, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted). But see Lavery
v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1025 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting these differences but not finding them
to be of overriding significance).
174. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457.
175. See Wiersema v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 648 F. Supp. 66, 67-68 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(applying statute of limitations applicable to nongovernmental employees under the ADEA); cf
Coleman, 693 F. Supp. at 1548 (holding that either the two-year or three-year, in case of willful
violation, statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) or the three-year statute of limitation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should apply).
176. Valaris v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 577 F. Supp. 282, 287-88 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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tions."' Every circuit court that has dealt with the issue has rejected this
argument by reading § 633a(f) literally or ignoring the argument altogeth-
er.1
78
If the court does not borrow the limitations period for private employees
alleging age discrimination or the Title VII limitations period, then only two
possible sources for a statute of limitations remain. First, the court could apply
a state statute of limitations. No circuit court has done so, because it would
lead to varying statutes of limitations across the country and severely burden
the administrative efforts of the EEOC.179 Second, the court could follow the
Ninth Circuit and apply the six-year statute of limitations for non-tort actions
against the federal government.' Other circuit courts have not applied the
six-year statute of limitations because they have noted the following anomaly:
federal employees alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin under Title VII would have thirty days to file a suit,
while federal employees alleging age discrimination under the ADEA would
have six years.'
Because all of the statute of limitations options that could be applied to §
633a have problems, the Tenth Circuit reached a pragmatic result by choosing
the most analogous and best alternative of the thirty-day statute of limitations
from Title VII, despite the countervailing legislative history.
The application of the thirty-day period of limitation to Mr. Jones, howev-
er, was unfair. Mr. Jones received a notice from the EEOC which stated, in
pertinent part: "As to any claim based on the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a), you MAY have up to six years after the
right of action first accrued."' 82 Although this notice does not unequivocally
state that Mr. Jones had six years in which to file an action, it is not even
close to thirty days. Thus, it is likely Mr. Jones was seriously misled by the
EEOC with information that denied him his day in court. The EEOC has
subsequently changed its position by approving the thirty-day period of limita-
tions for federal employees after a final administrative decision. 8 3 The Tenth
Circuit found the EEOC's change of position persuasive because it was consis-
tent with the court's interpretation of the analogy between Title VII and the
ADEA,'84 but the court also should have been persuaded by the misleading
notice sent to Mr. Jones. Fairness would mandate the choice of a six-year
statute of limitations for Mr. Jones, but the Tenth Circuit seemed more con-
cerned with the precedent it was setting.
177. See Coleman, 693 F. Supp. at 1547; Wiersema, 648 F. Supp. at 68.
178. Compare Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1994) (reading 633a(f) literally) and
Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022, 1024 (1st Cir. 1990) (same) and Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891
F.2d 216 221 (9th Cir. 1989) (same) and Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1989)
(same) with Jones, 32 F.3d at 1455-58 (ignoring the argument altogether).
179. DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1983).
180. Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 221.
181. Long, 22 F.3d at 57-58; Lavery, 918 F.2d at 1027.
182. Jones, 32 F.3d at 1457 n.7 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 1457.




In Arnold v. Duchesne County and Jones v. Runyon, the Tenth Circuit had
to determine which statute of limitations to borrow for a federal cause of
action. Congress could have avoided the problems facing the Tenth Circuit by
enacting statutes of limitations for the federal causes of action. In Arnold, the
Tenth Circuit was instructed by § 1988 to borrow an analogous state statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions."5 Congress could just as easily have enacted
§ 1988 with the instruction that the federal courts should apply a certain limi-
tations period for all civil rights actions and avoided the time-consuming and
expensive litigation. In Jones, the Tenth Circuit had to determine which feder-
al statute of limitations to apply to 29 U.S.C. § 633a, because Congress omit-
ted, without explanation, the statute of limitations that was originally pro-
posed."s Had Congress not omitted the limitations period, time-consuming
and expensive litigation over the issue could have been avoided.
Recently, Congress had a chance to correct its mistakes and eliminate
wasteful litigation on the issue of which statute of limitations to apply to fed-
eral causes without a limitations period. Congress enacted a general fallback
statute of limitations for all federal causes of action without a period of limita-
tions. "'87 Instead of fixing the problems, however, Congress decided, in spite
of recommendations by litigants and federal judges, that the fallback statute of
limitations should not be applied to any cause of action created by a federal
statute passed before December 1, 1990.88 Thus, the federal courts must
continue the long, expensive, and uncertain process of borrowing statutes of
limitations that Congress failed to provide for federal claims.
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